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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
By Anthony Murray*
Robert E. Aitken* *
INTRODUCTION
Under what circumstances may incriminating evidence lawfully be
obtained by police without a search warrant from an automobile and
be used against an accused in California courts? This article attempts
to answer that question.1  The answer is as easy to state-the evi-
dence may be used so long as it has not been obtained in an unreasonable
search and seizure-as it is difficult to apply. The Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution 2 and Article 1, Section 193 of the
California Constitution prohibit "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
Since automobiles are personal "effects"' 4 they are entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection.5 Auto searches, however, are governed by con-
stitutional standards of reasonableness quite different from those used
to test searches of dwelling houses, buildings and other places. The
justification for the different treatment lies in the movability of the
automobile. In general, it can be said that the rule of reasonableness
does not require a police officer to obtain a warrant to search a car
that may not be there when he returns. But in some California cases
the application of a reasonableness test involving auto searches has not
* J.D. 1964, Loyola University; member of the California Bar.
** J.D. 1958, University of Michigan; member of the California Bar.
1 We deal only with the constitutional reasonableness of a warrantless auto search
or inspection. We do not discuss the lawfulness of an arrest to which a search may be
related, probable cause to make an arrest, search or arrest warrants, or the circumstances
that entitle an officer to detain, question and frisk a suspect. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.
2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963).
2 ' The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
3 This Section of the California Constitution uses the identical language of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
4 Comment, Freedom of the Road: Public Safety v. Private Right, 14 Dn PAUL L.
R v. 381 (1964); Robinson v. State, 197 Ind. 144, 149 N.E. 891 (1925).
5 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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produced uniformity.0 In this article we examine important recent de-
velopments in automobile search cases which have been decided by the
United States Supreme Court and the California courts.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures had its roots in the Eighteenth Century. In 1761 the use
of Writs of Assistance, which empowered revenue officers to search
homes and other places for smuggled goods, was attacked in Boston
by James Otis. The Writs, he argued, placed "the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer."" In the English Parliament,
Sir William Pitt (the Elder) made his famous declaration of the invio-
lability of the home,8 and in 1765 Lord Camden, in Entick v. Carring-
ton,' enunciated a principle of English law which became part of the
Bill of Rights, the basic protection of which has become imbedded in the
concept of due process of law.10 The court there held unlawful the use
of a general executive warrant to break into a citizen's home and search
for evidence of a libelous utterance.11
From this insistence upon the protection of the individual's sovereignty
6 Compare People v. Simnons, 208 Cal. App. 2d 83, 25 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1962) with
Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948).
7 W. TUDOR, LIFE OF JAMES OTIS 66 (1823). See Justice Felix Frankfurter's dis-
cussion in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which includes the declaration of
John Adams:
Otis was a flame of fire; with a promptitude of classical allusions, a depth of
research, a rapid summary of historical events and dates, a profusion of legal au-
thorities, a prophetic glance of his eyes into futurity, and a rapid torrent of im-
petuous eloquence, he hurried away all before him. American Independence
was then and there born. The seeds of patriots and heroes, to defend the Non
sine Diis animosus infans; to defend the vigorous youth, were then and there sown.
Every man of an immense crouded audience appeared to me to go away as I
did, ready to take arms against Writs of Assistance. Then and there, was the first
scene of the first act of opposition, to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then
and there, the child Independence was born. In fifteen years, i.e. in 1776, he
grew up to manhood and declared himself free. Id. at 364 n.3.
8 The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown.
It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through it-the storm may
enter, the rain may enter-but the King of England cannot enter-all his forces dare
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement! 15 T. HANS a, PARLIMENTARY HISTORY
OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARIIESr PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, 1307 (1806-1820).
9 19 Howell's State Trials, col. 1030 (1765).
10 id. at 1074. Mr. Justice Frankfurter alluded to this principle in Frank v. Mary-
land, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959).
11 19 Howell's State Trials, col. 1030 (1765). Lord Camden declared:
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the
necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well
as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search for
evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too the innocent would be
confounded with the guilty. Id. at 1073.
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over his own affairs came the command of the Fourth Amendment
that in conducting searches and seizures the government must not act
unreasonably. By proscribing unreasonable searches the Fourth Amend-
ment did not bar the warrantless search. However, the warrantless
search is regarded as an exception to the general rule that the "Fourth
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the
police."' 2  Consequently, warrantless searches are unreasonable un-
less they fall within established exceptions to the general rule requir-
ing a warrant.13
In 1914 the Supreme Court was first faced with the problem of the ef-
fect an unlawful search had upon the admissibility of the evidence seized.
The Court held, in Weeks v. United States,'4 that the use of evi-
dence secured through an illegal search and seizure was barred by
the Fourth Amendment in a federal prosecution.15 For forty-seven
years, however, the rule applied to bar the use of illegally obtained evi-
dence only in federal courts.'1  Wolf v. Colorado'1 held in 1949 that
12 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969), quoting from McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
13 The most important exception is the search conducted incident to a lawful arrest.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 836 (West Supp. 1968) authorizes an officer to make an arrest:
1. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a public offense in his presence.
2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
3. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a felony, whether or not a felony has in fact been committed.
Only arrests made pursuant to subsections 1 and 3 will support an incidental search.
People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1955). Subsection 2 permits an arrest
of a person who has in fact committed a felony even though the arresting officer, at
the time of arrest, did not have reasonable cause to believe the person had committed a
felony. A search, however, must be reasonable and therefore cannot be made as an
incident to an arrest not based on reasonable cause. A search incident to such an
arrest "can be no more reasonable than the arrest itself." People v. Brown, id. at 644,
290 P.2d at 530.
Other exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant are the consent
search, the border search, Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966), and
the auto search based on reasonable cause to believe the car contains items subject to
seizure, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The auto search exception is
discussed in detail in section H1 infra.
'4 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
15 The Weeks ruling was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth
Amendment; rather, the decision was a matter of judicial implication. Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
10 Originally, the exclusionary rule embodied in Weeks applied only if federal agents
were the guilty parties in procuring the evidence. If the evidence was illegally obtained
by state officials or private parties and then turned over to the federal officers on a
"silver platter" it could be used in a federal trial. But in Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960), the Supreme Court rejected the "silver platter" doctrine. See C.H.
PRrrCHETr, THE AMEWCAN CONsvrruTION 608 (2d ed. 1968).
17 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is "implicit in the 'con-
cept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause,"' 8 but the Court decided that the
Weeks exclusionary rule was not embodied in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Finally, in 1961, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio'0 followed the lead
of the California Supreme Court2" and held that "all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court." 21  From these decisions there
emerged a constitutionally guarded "right of privacy".22
Since the Fourth Amendment applies only to a "search", the first
question is whether the evidence was obtained in a search in the con-
stitutional sense. "Whe term [search] implies some exploratory inves-
tigation or an invasion and quest, a looking for or seeking out. . . .A
search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed
and that the object searched for has been hidden or intentionally put
out of the way."'23 An officer's observation of evidence in plain sight
from a place where he has a right to be does not constitute a search.24
18 Id. at 27-28.
19 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
21 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). In a later case, Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963), the Court determined that the standard of reasonableness is the same
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
22 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
23 Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 605, 371 P.2d 288, 289-90, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 552, 553-54 (1962); People v. West, 144 Cal. App. 2d 214, 219, 300 P.2d 729,
733 (1956); People v. Prochnau, 251 Cal. App. 2d 22, 29-30 n.6, 59 Cal. Rptr. 265, 271
n.6 (1967).
24 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (registration card in plain sight on
metal door stripping); People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 390 P.2d 381, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605
(1964) (officers in apartment garage saw marijuana cigarette on car dash board);
People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956) (bag containing narcotics on
car seat); People v. Tambini, 275 Cal. App. 2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1969) (marijuana
in plainly visible box in car; no attempt to distinguish visibility of container from
contraband inside which was presumably not in plain sight); People v. Cacioppo, 264
Cal. App. 2d 392, 70 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968) (flashlight revealed benzedrine pills on car
floor); People v. Schultz, 263 Cal. App. 2d 110, 69 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1968) (marijuana
seed on car floor); People v. Sjosten, 262 Cal. App. 2d 539, 68 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1968)
(stolen record player visible in car); People v. Harris, 256 Cal. App. 2d 455, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1967) (stolen phonograph tapes in plain view in car); People v. Norman,
252 Cal. App. 2d 381, 60 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1967) (stolen furs visible on back seat);
People v. Lozano, 250 Cal. App. 2d 58, 58 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1967) (plainly visible
burgled coins); People v. Nieto, 247 Cal. App. 2d 364, 55 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1966)
(guns under front seat of car); Mardis v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d 70, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 263 (1963) (gun in open glove compartment); People v. Beverly, 200 Cal. App.
2d 119, 19 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1962) (stolen radiators on back seat); People v. Russell, 195
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Similarly, evidence obtained in the course of making an inventory of an
impounded car seized during an auto safety inspection,25 found in
26an abandoned car, or revealed in an examination of an auto which
itself constitutes evidence of a crime, 27 may be seized and such in-
spections are not considered searches. We deal here with the most com-
monly encountered auto searches and inspections. We eliminate from
the discussion special rules governing border searches, 28 searches made
pursuant to the consent of a car owner or occupant,29 the admission
of evidence where the defendant failed to move to suppress the evi-
dence before trial,30 or to object to its introduction, 31 and searches and
seizures made by private citizens. 
32
Cal. App. 2d 529, 16 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1961) (trunk lid flew open exposing stolen whiskey);
People v. Linden, 185 Cal. App. 2d 752, 8 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1960) (flashlight revealed
gun protruding from beneath two pillows in car); People v. Wright, 153 Cal.
App. 2d 35, 313 P.2d 868 (1957) (clothing on back seat); People v. Martin, 140 Cal.
App. 2d 387, 295 P.2d 33 (1956) (marijuana on defendant's shirt and in a sack held
between his heels); People v. Johnson, 139 Cal. App. 2d 663, 294 P.2d 189 (1956)
(marijuana cigarette seen on dashboard by officer sitting in defendant's car interrogating
him).
"In plain sight" is to be distinguished from evidence "in plain smell." People v.
Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 59, 442 P.2d 665, 670, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590 (1968).
25 The inventory and safety inspection rules are discussed under Section IV infra.
26 People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966); see
CAL. VER. CODE § 22702 (West Supp. 1970).
27 People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d -, 450 P.2d 564, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1969) (blood
stains in interior and fibers and paint flecks matching victim's shoes on car floor mat);
People v. Talbot, 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d 633, 51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1966) (blood
stains on car); People v. Norman, 252 Cal. App. 2d 381, 60 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1967)
(car examined to determine identity of occupants); People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App.
2d 112, 53 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1966) (car in which deceased burned to death examined to
determine cause of fire).
28 Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966); compare People v.
Mendoza, 251 Cal. App. 2d 835, 60 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1967) with People v. Gale, 46 Cal.
2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956) (over dissent, search at Mexican border held not sub-
ject to border search rules).
29 People v. Martinez, 259 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 943, 65 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968); People
v. Dahlke, 257 Cal. App. 2d 82, 64 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1967); People v. Beverly, 200 Cal.
App. 2d 119, 19 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1962); People v. Anushevitz, 183 Cal. App. 2d 752, 6
Cal. Rptr. 785 (1960); People v. Underhill, 169 Cal. App. 2d 862, 338 P.2d 38 (1959);
People v. Hickens, 165 Cal. App. 2d 364, 331 P.2d 796 (1958).
80 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1968).
31 People v. Green, 257 Cal. App. 2d 240, 64 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1967); People v.
Barreto, 256 Cal. App. 2d 392, 64 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1967).
32 People v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d -, 449 P.2d 230, 74 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1969);
Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d -, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968);
People v. Katzman, 258 Cal. App. 2d 777, 66 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1968); People v. Wright,
245 Cal. App. 2d 265, 53 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1966); People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App.
2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1963).
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111. CARROLL V. UNITED STATES: 3 3 THE REASONABLE
CAUSE AUTO SEARCH
The auto search analysis begins with the fundamental principle that
searches of autos must meet the Fourth Amendment test of reasonable-
ness8 4 and that searches conducted without warrants are unreasonable
unless "those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate [show]
that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.""
An important exception to this general rule is the search incident to a
valid arrest.36 Another exception has been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court: the reasonable cause auto search. On Septem-
ber 29, 1921, two undercover prohibition agents arranged to buy liquor
from Carroll and Kiro in a Grand Rapids, Michigan apartment. Carroll
and Kiro left in an Oldsmobile to get the liquor somewhere east of Grand
Rapids but did not return. On December 15, two and one-half months
later, the agents saw the same Oldsmobile heading east from Grand Ra-
pids. Carroll and Kiro were in the car. The agents stopped the car on
the suspicion that it contained liquor. Under the Prohibition Act87 a
first possession of liquor offense was a misdemeanor. Since the agents
only suspected but had not seen Carroll and Kiro in possession of liquor
when they stopped the car, no misdemeanor had at that time been
committed in their presence and they had no authority to arrest the sus-
pects. 88 The agents nonetheless searched the car, found sixty-eight
bottles of liquor and then arrested Carroll and Kiro.
Carroll presented a unique situation: a search of an automobile
made without a warrant and not incident to a valid arrest. In an
opinion by Chief Justice Taft, the Court rejected the defendants' con-
tention that the search could be justified only if incidental to an
arrest. The Court announced a new exception to the general rule that a
search is unreasonable unless made pursuant to a search warrant. Ana-
lyzing the intended meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Court lent
great significance to a 1789 Act of Congress89 regulating the collection of
duties. The Act required a warrant for the search of a building to en-
force payment of duties but permitted a search without a warrant of
33 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
-4 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156, 158-59 (1925).
35 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969), quoting from McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
36 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 836 (West Cum. Supp. 1968).
37 Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (repealed 1935).
38 But see CAL. PEN. CODE § 836 (West Cum. Supp. 1968).
89 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29 (repealed 1790).
[Vol. 3
LIMITATIONS ON AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
any ship or vessel which agents had reasonable cause to believe con-
tained merchandise subject to duty. Thus Congress drew an important
distinction between permanent buildings and movable vehicles. The
Court observed:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment we find in the First Congress, and in the following Second and
Fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search
warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwell-
ing house or similar place, and like goods in course of transportation
and concealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be put
out of reach of a search warrant.40 (emphasis added.)
The importance of the Carroll case, however, lies as much in what
it did not hold as in the new exception it declared. The distinction, as
to the necessity of obtaining a warrant, between vehicles and permanent
structures relates not to all vehicles but to movable vehicles. The
term "movable" as used in Carroll, has a special meaning. It is not a
synonym of "mobile" or an antonym of "stationary" or "immobile".
A vehicle is not movable in the Carroll sense merely because it floats,
has wheels, or is capable of being moved. A vehicle is movable when
there is someone at large who has the power and ability to move it before
an officer can obtain a warrant. When an owner or other person with
the right to control a vehicle is free to move it, the officer who reason-
ably suspects that the vehicle contains items subject to seizure need not
obtain a warrant because it is "not practicable" to do so. Carroll made
"practicability" the complement of "movability". In examining this vital
point, the Court reasoned:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the
beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect
of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search
of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.41 (emphasis added.)
The Court underscored its holding that practicability limits the right
to search a movable vehicle without a warrant by cautioning that the
rule "fulfills the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment. In cases where
40 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925).
41 Id. at 153. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969), the Court af-
firmed the continued vitality of the practicability test by quoting Carroll's language
cited here.
1970]
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the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used
... *"4 (emphasis added.) Having emphasized the narrow confines
of the rule, the Court announced that:
The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent
on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the
seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend
against the law. The seizure in such a proceeding comes before the
arrest .... 43
The two essential conditions to the validity of the reasonable cause
auto search under the Carroll exception are: 1) The officer must have
reasonable cause to believe the auto contains items subject to seizure,
and 2) the auto must be "movable" in the sense that the officer
reasonably believes that it may be moved by someone who is free to
do so and that it is therefore not "reasonably practicable" to secure a
search warrant.44
42 Id. at 156.
43 Id. at 158-59. Rejecting the defendants' contention that the search was illegal
because not incidental to an arrest, the Court said: 'This is certainly a very unsatis-
factory line of difference when the main object of the section is to forfeit and suppress
the liquor, the arrest of the individual being only incidental as shown by the lightness
of the penalty." Id. at 157-58 (emphasis added). This limitation of the holding to
contraband goods, where the object of the search is to forfeit and suppress the goods
and only incidentially to arrest, has neither been discussed nor followed in the
California cases.
Carroll is a factually unfortunate case. The holding that the agents had reasonable
cause to believe Carroll's car contained liquor, just because it was seen on a freeway
leading east from Grand Rapids two and one half months after Carroll departed in
that direction in the same car after promising to obtain liquor, is certainly questionable.
Such reasoning gave the agents virtually unlimited authority to stop Carroll's car any
time they discovered it eastbound from Grand Rapids to Detroit.
44 The Supreme Court applied its Carroll rule in Husty v. United States, 282
U.S. 694 (1931) and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). In Husty, a pro-
hibition officer had reliable information that Husty, a known bootlegger who had been
twice convicted of Prohibition Act violations, had liquor in his car. The officer found
the car, waited until Husty returned, searched the car which contained 18 cases of
liquor, and then arrested Husty. In an opinion written by Justice Stone, the Court
upheld the search under Carroll: "The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the search,
without warrant, of an automobile, for liquor illegally transported or possessed, if
the search is upon probable cause; and the arrest for the transportation or possession
need not precede the search." Husty v. United States, supra at 700.
In Brinegar v. United States, supra, officers parked near the Missouri-Oklahoma
line saw Brinegar, a known bootlegger, drive by in a heavily-loaded car. The officers
stopped and searched the car and found 13 cases of liquor. The Court held the search
reasonable under Carroll. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson, joined by Justices
Frankfurter and Murphy, wrote: "I dissent because I regard it as an extension of the
Carroll case, which already has been too much taken by enforcement officers as
blanket authority to stop and search cars on suspicion," 1d, at 183.
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Application of the Carroll exception by California courts can best
be understood by a separate consideration of these questions.
A. Did the officer have reasonable cause to believe the
auto contained items subject to seizure?
The first requirement of the Carroll exception is that the officers
in fact have reasonable cause to believe the auto contains evidence that
they properly may seize.45 Several California cases have failed to pass
this test. In People v. Gale,4 defendant's car was stopped at a sheriff's
check station at the Mexican border. An officer noticed apparently re-
cent damage to the front of the car, ordered defendant out, searched the
car, and found a narcotic under the front seat. The California Supreme
Court rejected the Attorney General's argument that the front end dam-
age gave the officer probable cause to believe the car had been in-
volved in a hit and run, and held the search unlawful because it was
not based on reasonable cause to believe the car contained items sub-
ject to seizure. The court quoted from the Carroll case: "It would
be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized
to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus sub-
ject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and
45 In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), F.B.I. agents stopped a car
occupied by Henry and Pierotti whom the agents suspected were implicated in a theft
of an interstate whiskey shipment. In the car the agents saw cartons bearing the
"Admiral" label and addressed to an Ohio company. After an inquiry revealed that the
cartons had been stolen, the agents formally arrested Henry and Pierotti. The Supreme
Court held that the search could only be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest be-
cause when the agents stopped the car they did not have reasonable cause to believe it
contained stolen property. Thus, the lack of reasonable cause eliminated the Carroll
exception as justification for the search. The Court held that an arrest was complete
when the car was stopped. Since at that time the agents did not have probable cause to
believe the defendants had committed a felony, the search was not incidental to a
valid arrest and the evidence was improperly seized. "[Aln arrest is not justified by
what the subsequent search discloses." Id. at 104. The importance of Henry for
present purposes is its clear holding that the warrantless search not incidental to an
arrest is unlawful unless supported by reasonable cause leading the officers to believe
that the car contains items subject to seizure. The Court said:
The fact that the suspects were in an automobile is not enough. Carroll vs.
United States ...liberalized the rule governing searches when a moving vehicle
is involved. But that decision merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant on
grounds of practicality. It did not dispense with the need for probable cause.
Id. at 104.
See Comment, Search and Seizure of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest for an
Offense Other than a Traffic Violation, 31 Mo. L. REv. 436 (1966).
46 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956).
47 See CAL. Vms. CoDE § 22655 (West Supp. 1970) which authorizes an officer to im-
pound and inspect an auto which he has reasonable cause to believe has been involved in
a hit-and-run accident.
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indignity of such a search."48
In People v. Molarius0 the court condemned a search of a car that
was stopped because the driver had made an illegal "U" turn.50 People
v. Moray5' involved an auto search that turned up marijuana where
officers stopped defendant for a traffic violation. The court held that
reasonable cause was not supplied by the officers' additional observa-
tion that defendant raised his shoulder as if to reach in his pocket,
leaned toward the right hand seat, and appeared to make an effort to
keep his head pointed ahead at that time.52 In People v. Franklin,"8
an officer stopped a car on February 10, 1966, solely because it had
a 1965 Illinois license plate. He had previously been an Illinois
police officer and knew that in Illinois and California the license
renewal deadline was sometime in February. The occupants of the
stopped car gave the officer permission to inspect the car for registration
and the inspection yielded marijuana. The court held unlawful the
"indiscriminate stopping" 54 on mere speculation that the registration
had expired. The search that followed was therefore an unreasonable
"fishing expedition ' 55 not justified by reasonable cause.56
48 46 Cal. 2d at 256, 294 P.2d at 15.
49 146 Cal. App. 2d 129, 303 P.2d 350 (1956).
50 The court was not impressed with this asserted justification because the officers
admitted that they advised defendants they were being arrested only for a traffic viola-
tion. Defendants were booked for vagrancy but were not charged with the illegal
possession of burglary tools. Id. at 130, 303 P.2d at 351.
51 222 Cal. App. 2d 743, 35 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1963).
52 Id. at 744, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
53 261 Cal. App. 2d 703, 68 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1968).
54 Id. at 707, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
55 Id.
56 See State v. Cuezze, 249 S.W.2d 373 (1952); Search and Seizure of an Automobile
Incident to an Arrest for an Offense Other than a Traffic Violation, supra note 45;
1 J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIzUREs AND IMmuNmEs 107-08 (1961); Note, Constitutional
Law-Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 413 (1960);
Note, Search and Seizure-Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959 Wisc.
L. REv. 347; Simeone, Search and Seizure Incident to Traffic Violations, 6 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 506 (1961); Agata, Searches and Seizures Incident to Traffic Violations-A
Reply to Professor Simeone, 7 ST. Louis U.LJ. 1 (1962); Note, Search and Seizure
Incident to Traffic Violations, 4 WILLAME=TE L.J. 247 (1966).
Compare the above with the rules governing roadblock searches (discussed in Section
IV. C. infra); see also Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948)
(indiscriminate auto and personal searches at blockades without reasonable cause);
People v. De La Torre, 257 Cal. App. 2d 162, 64 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1967) (CAL. VEI. CODE
§ 2814 (West Supp. 1970) authorizing roadblock for purpose of conducting equipment
safety checks held constitutional); City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla.
1959) (roadblock for purpose of inspecting drivers' licenses held reasonable); United
States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, sub nor.,
United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960) (check point established to stop
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Many California cases approve of warrantless searches not ac-
companied by probable cause for arrest. In People v. Martin,57 two
men in a car parked at night on a lovers lane in Oakland fled when
they saw a police car. When the officers pulled them over they saw
that the two men had their hands on a bag on the seat. The bag con-
tained narcotics. The California Supreme Court upheld the stop and
search.
In People v. Blodgett,58 officers ordered two people out of a cab
that was double-parked in front of a hotel at 3:00 a.m. As one of the
officers opened the rear door defendant withdrew his hand from behind
the seat. The officers removed the seat and found marijuana cigarettes.
The court held that the search was proper, not as incident to the cab
driver's traffic violation, to which the search was unrelated, but be-
cause defendant's furtive gesture justified the officers' belief that he
was hiding contraband. Thus the search was reasonable under the
Carroll exception. Justice Carter vigorously dissented from the hold-
ings in both Martin and Blodgett. In Blodgett, he said:
I cannot agree that the sight of a cab parked in front of a hotel in the
early hours of the morning is sufficient to constitute reasonable cause for
a police investigation. . . .Just how it can be said that two people get-
ting into a cab early in the morning is 'unusual conduct' is not entirely
clear to me. I had thought that it was a frequent occurrence.59
People v. Simons" is an unfortunate case. A highway patrolman
made a radio check of a car that defendant had left at a service station
for repairs but found that the car had not been reported stolen. The
officer nevertheless inspected the car for a registration certificate. The
certificate was taped on the top of the dashboard but the officer de-
nied seeing it. In the back seat he found various non-incriminating
items and testified that "because of' these items he continued his search.
Still purporting to be looking for a registration slip, he opened a zipper
shaving case in which he found several bottles of narcotic pills. De-
fendant was arrested when he arrived two days later to pick up his car.
The court upheld the search as a reasonable inspection for registra-
cars coming from particular house where police suspected meeting of organized criminals
was taking place held reasonable); Note, Random Road Blocks and the Law of Search &
Seizure, 46 Iowa L. REV. 802 (1961); Note, Constitutional Law-Use of Police Road-
block to Inspect Drivers' Licenses, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 417 (1960).
57 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956).
58 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956).
59 Id. at 118, 293 P.2d at 59.
00 208 Cal. App. 2d 83, 25 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1962).
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tion.61  It is difficult to understand how the officer was reasonable in
his asserted belief that a registration certificate might be found in a
shaving case.
s
Genuinely suspicious circumstances may afford a reasonable basis
for stopping and searching a car. The circumstance most frequently
invoked as suspicious is the "furtive" gesture or conduct of a car occu-
pant. Included among the various gestures classified as furtive are the
"forward lean", which is said to reasonably lead an officer to believe that
the suspect is trying to hide evidence under the seat or on the floor,"8
the "throwing motion",64 flight from police officers,6" and other conduct
raising a suspicion that the suspect is trying to conceal or destroy evi-
dence.66 Other cases have viewed as suspicious circumstances giving
rise to a right to search, the mere presence of a car in an unusual place
or at an unusual time.6 7  Similarly, the mere fact that a person
evasively or untruthfully answered questions about his presence in a
place has been held to give rise to the same right."'
B. Was the car "movable" so that it was not reasonably
practicable for the officer to obtain a search warrant?
As noted, the practicability of obtaining a warrant is the measure
61 CAL. VEH. CODE § 2805 (West 1954) permits an investigation to determine title
and locate registration. The inspection for registration is discussed in Section IV. A.
infra.
62 But see People v. Gil, 248 Cal. App. 2d 189, 56 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1967) (no reason
to believe property to be inventoried would be under floor mat where marijuana
cigarette was found). A car search may be unreasonably broad in scope either because
the item sought is unlikely to be in the place searched or because it physically would
not fit in such a place-the search for an "elephant in a glove compartment."
63 People v. Wigginton, 254 Cal. App. 2d 321, 62 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967) (defendant
leaned forward after police car started following him); People v. Shapiro, 213 Cal.
App. 2d 618, 28 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1963) (driver leaned forward and car wheel hit curb
after police turned on red light); People v. Sanson, 156 Cal. App. 2d 250, 319 P.2d
422 (1957) (two front seat passengers appeared to be hiding something under seat).
64 People v. Anders, 167 Cal. App. 2d 65, 333 P.2d 854 (1959) (defendant threw
package containing marijuana cigarettes from car window).
6G People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d. 52 (1956); Perez v. Superior Court,
250 Cal. App. 2d 695, 58 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967).
66 People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956) (defendant withdrew
hand from behind rear seat of cab where marijuana cigarettes found).
67 People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956) (two people in double-
parked cab at 3:00 a.m.); People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956) (two
men parked at night on lovers' lane); People v. Beverly, 200 Cal. App. 2d 119, 19
Cal. Rptr. 67 (1962) (officers stopped car because "it was kind of unusual" for a car to
be leaving wrecking yard area at 9:30 p.m.).
68 People v. Brajevich, 174 Cal. App. 2d 438, 344 P.2d 815 (1959) (defendant
walking on street gave evasive answers about his presence and denied ownership of a
car parked nearby that contained registration showing defendant as owner).
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of the Carroll exception, as it is the measure of the other exceptions, to
the general rule that a warrantless search is unreasonable. A mov-
able car may be searched if there exists reasonable cause to believe it
contains contraband, but only if accompanied by the impracticability of
obtaining a search warrant.69 This principle is illustrated in Preston v.
United States.
70
Officers arrested Preston and his two companions for vagrancy, took
the defendants to police headquarters, and impounded the car in which
defendants had been sitting but did not search it at the time of arrest.
After they booked the suspects the officers went to the impound garage,
searched the car, and found two loaded revolvers and other evidence
of a contemplated robbery. Assuming without deciding that the arrest
for vagrancy was proper, the Supreme Court held that the search violated
the Fourth Amendment. The search was unrelated to the vagrancy arrest
and was too remote in time and place to be considered contemporaneous
with the arrest. Thus the search could not be justified as incident to
the arrest. The Court then held that the Carroll exception did not
justify the search. Since the suspects were in custody and the car was
in the police impound garage, there was no danger that the car would
be moved before the officers could obtain a warrant. The Court said:
The search of the car was not undertaken until petitioner and his com-
panions had been arrested and taken into custody to the police station
and the car had been towed to the garage. At this point there was no
danger that any of the men arrested could have used any weapons in the
car or could have destroyed any evidence of a crime assuming that
there are articles which can be the 'fruits' or 'implements' of the
crime of vagrancy . . . [n]or, since the men were under arrest at the
police station and the car was in police custody at a garage, was there
any danger that the car would be moved out of the locality or jurisdic-
tion. See Carroll v. U.S ..... 71
While some federal jurisdictions have followed Preston's strict inter-
69 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1925). California courts are not disposed to require that one
officer watch the car while the other obtains a warrant. "To require in the present case
that one officer go to obtain a warrant while the other remains camped by the mari-
juana would further no recognizable interest; it would magnify technicality at the
expense of reason." People v. Kampmann, 258 Cal. App. 2d 529, 533, 65 Cal. Rptr.
798, 802 (1968) (not an auto case); People v. Tambini, 275 Cal. App. 2d -, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 179 (1969) (auto case).
70 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
71 Id. at 368-69. See also Comment, Interference with the Right to Free Move-
ment: Stopping and Search of Vehicles, 51 CALU'. L. Rnv. 907 (1963).
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pretation of the Carroll exception,72 California courts have not been
uniform in applying Preston to the Carroll exception. In People v.
Terry73 officers saw a marijuana cigarette on the dashboard of defend-
ant's car which was parked in an apartment garage. After observing
defendant escaping from his apartment through a window, the officers
seized the cigarette. The court upheld the search on the basis of the
car's movability.
People v. Fritz74 is an example of a proper application of the Carroll
exception. Officers arrested four armed robbery suspects who had ar-
rived at an apartment in two cars. Neither car was owned by any of
the suspects. Believing the cars contained guns used in the robbery,
the officers searched both cars and in one found two revolvers. The
search was proper because the cars were movable and it was not prac-
ticable to obtain a warrant. "The search of these vehicles for this
purpose had to be immediate because neither belonged to any of the
arrestees . . .and each could have been picked up by its respective
owner at any time."' 75  People v. Garrison76 illustrates the concept of
movability. Defendant was arrested for vagrancy and his companion
for forgery. Defendant's car was impounded and searched four days
later. The search revealed evidence of forgery. The court held the
search unreasonable. It was neither incident to the arrest nor a proper
search of a movable vehicle. The court explained:
Inasmuch as the search in the instant case was not incident to a lawful
arrest, the question remains whether the rule allowing reasonable
searches of vehicles under the Carroll decision applies. We think it
does not. The rule is based upon the capacity of a vehicle to depart
from a jurisdiction. In the present case the vehicle was impounded
72 United States v. Marrese, 336 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1964) (search will be held un-
reasonable when suspect in custody); United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924 (7th Cir.
1960) (search unreasonable where defendant in custody and officers had ample time to
obtain warrant). But cf. Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965) (car search
upheld though defendant in custody). See Comment, Freedom of the Road: Public
Safety v. Private Right, 14 DE PAuL L. REv. 381, 385-86 (1965).
73 61 Cal. 2d 137, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964).
74 253 Cal. App. 2d 7, 61 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1967).
75 Id. at 16, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 253. The court also observed that since the cars were
not parked on a highway they could not be impounded under CAL. VEH. CODE § 22651
(West 1960). The right to impound is discussed in Section IV.B. infra. See also People
v. Brajevich, 174 Cal. App. 2d 438, 344 P.2d 815 (1959), where officers searched de-
fendant's car because be gave evasive answers as to the reason for his presence and denied
ownership of the car whose registration slip showed him as the registered owner. The
sufficiency of the cause for search may be open to question, but because defendant had
not been arrested the case met the movability test.
76 189 Cal. App. 2d 549, 11 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1961).
[Vol. 3
LIMITATIONS ON AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
and was no more movable than a dwelling house. A search warrant
should have been procured.7 7 (emphasis added.)
Other cases have misconstrued the Carroll exception. People v.
Daily78 upheld an auto search as incident to the owner's arrest and
then cited Carroll as authority for the holding. The reliance on Car-
roll was misplaced since the incidental search was precisely what was
not involved. Perez v. Superior Court79 suggested that Carroll, which
plainly required reasonable cause to believe the car contains contra-
band, permits an "investigative or exploratory search of an automo-
bile incident to an equivocal situation which does not suggest the
commission of a specific offense." °80  In a recent case, the court did
not discuss the fact that defendant was in custody when officers found
marijuana and hashish in the hubcap of his car. The court stated
as a rule the following: "[A]n officer may conduct a warrantless search
of an automobile if he had probable cause to believe that it contains
contraband and 'where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.' "s However, because the defendant
was in custody, the car was not movable.
III. Tim AuTo SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Because arrests are so often made in or near automobiles, the right
to search and the permissible scope of a search made incident to an
arrest is of great importance. The incidental search derives its initial
validity from a valid arrest although the search can become unreasonable
if its permissible scope is exceeded.8 2  Since all searches must be rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment, for an incidental search to be
valid, it must be based upon antecedent probable cause for an arrest.
Under California law 3 a felony arrest is valid if the suspect has in
fact committed a felony even though the arresting officer did not have
probable cause at the time of arrest to believe that the arrestee had com-
mitted the crime. Such an arrest, however, will not support an inci-
77 Id. at 555, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03.
78 157 Cal. App. 2d 649, 321 P.2d 469 (1958).
79 250 Cal. App. 2d 695, 58 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967). Two persons jumped out of a
car parked in a vacant lot and ran when police arrived. The area was littered with
beer cans. A search revealed unopened beer cans, marijuana in a bag in a heater
vent, and white straw paper. Defendant was arrested when he returned to the car.
so Id. at 698, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
81 People v. Barrett, 2 Cal. App. 3d 142, 146, 82 Cal. Rptr. 424, 426 (1969).
82 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
83 CAL. PEN. CoDE § 836 (2) (West Curn. Supp. 1968).
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dental search.84
As seen in the above discussion of the Carroll exception, the auto
search not incident to an arrest is based on the officers' reasonable
belief that a movable auto contains items subject to seizure. The inci-
dental search, on the other hand, depends for its validity upon the
propriety of the arrest to which it is related. These are the foundational
differences between the two kinds of searches. Although the differences
may at first appear to be substantial, the similarities in the two searches
may be even more significant. We must remember that both the Carroll
search and the incidental search are exceptions to the general Fourth
Amendment proscription of searches made without a search warrant.
It is now plain that both exceptions depend upon resolution of a
single question: Under the particular circumstances was it reasonably
practicable for the officer to secure a warrant?8   When the officer
reasonably believes that a movable auto contains contraband, he is
confronted with an emergency that justifies dispensing with a warrant.
Thus the practicability of obtaining a warrant depends upon the exis-
tence of an emergency. The same is true of the incidental search. The
right to search, and the scope of the search, are measured by the need
for immediate action occasioned by an emergency situation. Only in
an emergency is it impracticable to obtain a warrant. The emergency
that justifies a search under the Carroll exception is the movability of
the automobile. The emergencies that will justify a search, without
warrant incident to an arrest, arise when there is a substantial likelihood
that unless the officer makes an immediate search: 1) Evidence may be
destroyed, 2) the officer or other person may be injured, and 3) the
suspect may escape.
A. History of the incidental search
The United States Supreme Court decisions concerning the incidental
search tread a tortuous and confusing path. The difficulty is encoun-
tered in defining the scope of the search incident to arrest. The warrant-
less search incident to arrest was probably set forth for the first time, in
dictum, in Weeks v. United States8 6 where the Court suggested there is a
right to search the person of the accused incident to his arrest. Carroll,
again in dictum, extended the rule to include an incidental search for
84 People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1955), discussed in supra
note 13.
85 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
88 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
[Vol. 3
LIMITATIONS ON AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
items "upon his person or in his control . ".8."I" Agnello v. United
States,s8 in 1925, held unreasonable a search of the defendant's house
made after the defendant had been arrested and taken into custody
several blocks from the house. The search of the house was not sub-
stantially contemporaneous in time and place with, and therefore not
incidental to, the arrest. Nor was the search dictated by an emergency
that made it impracticable to obtain a warrant. The Court announced
a rule suggesting that if the search had been contemporaneous with the
arrest, the officers might properly have searched the house for evidence
even in the absence of an emergency.
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search per-
sons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place
where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected
with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed,
as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody,
is not to be doubted.
89
In Marron v. United States,"0 officers searched a building pursuant
to a search warrant authorizing seizure of intoxicating liquors and articles
used in their manufacture. In a closet they found incriminating docu-
ments. Defendant was not on the premises but the officers arrested one
of defendant's partners. The Court held that although the warrant did
not authorize seizure of the documents, the seizure was justified as an in-
cident to the arrest of defendant's partner. The officers, said the Court,
"had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in
order to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enter-
prise."9 1 Marron was the first clear holding that the place of arrest might
be searched incident to the arrest. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States,92 the next case to consider the question, held unlawful a broad
search of defendants' business office allegedly incident to an arrest for
conspiracy to sell liquor. The Court viewed the search as excessive in
scope 93 and held that since the officers had ample time to obtain a war-
rant they should have done so. "Notwithstanding he [the agent] had
an abundance of information and time to swear out a valid warrant, he
87 267 U.S. at 158.
88 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
89 Id. at 30.
90 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
91 Id. at 199. Citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
92 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
98 The Court distinguished the case from Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927), on the ground that the search in Marron was limited in scope.
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failed to do so. . . . It [the search] was a lawless invasion of the prem-
ises and a general exploratory search in the hope that evidence of crime
might be found."9  On this basis the Court distinguished the search
from that in Marron. United States v. Lefkowitz"5 also condemned
the exploratory search, holding unreasonable a search of desk drawers
and a cabinet incident to a lawful arrest.
Later cases dealing with the validity and scope of the incidental search
did little to clarify the governing standards. Of all the cases that de-
parted from the practicability of obtaining a warrant as the test of an in-
cidental search, Harris v. United States96 is the prime offender. Acting
on the authority of valid arrest warrants, F.B.I. agents arrested defendant
in his four room apartment for forgery. For the next five hours, alleg-
edly as an incident to the arrest and acting without a search warrant,
they carefully ransacked his entire apartment for evidence of forgery.
Near the end of the search, an agent found a number of altered draft
cards and related documents in a sealed envelope marked "George
Harris, personal papers" which were in a bedroom bureau drawer. The
papers were concededly in no way related to the purpose of the arrest.
Defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of the draft board papers
was upheld by the Supreme Court in a five-four decision. The Court
held that a search incident to an arrest may, "under appropriate circum-
stances, extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises under his immediate control. '97  The "appropriate circum-
stances" that justified the search of Harris' entire apartment were not
specified except by the Court's reasoning that "[h]is control extended
quite as much to the bedroom in which the draft cards were found as to
the living room in which he was arrested."98 The Court concluded that
the search was not a general exploration. 9
A year after Harris, the Court decided Trupiano v. United States,109
a temporary restoration of reason. Federal agents, on the basis of
94 282 U.S. at 358.
95 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
96 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
97 Id. at 151.
98 Id. at 152.
99 Id. at 153. See also dissent by Frankfurter, J.:
Thus, one's views regarding circumstances like those here presented ultimately
depend upon one's understanding of the history and the function of the Fourth
Amendment. A decision may turn on whether one gives that Amendment a place
second to none in the Bill of Rights, or considers it on the whole a kind of nuisance,
a serious impediment in the war against crime. Id. at 157.
100 334 U.S. 699 (1948), overruled in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950).
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knowledge gained at least three weeks before that defendants were
operating an illegal liquor distillery, raided the distillery without ob-
taining search or arrest warrants. They arrested one defendant who was
operating the still, searched the entire premises, and seized contraband.
The Court held the search unreasonable. The arrest of the defendant
for operating the still, a felony, was proper, but the later search, even
though it was claimed to have been made as an incident to the arrest,
was unlawful. Citing Carroll and Go-Bart, the Court declared the rule
of practicability: "It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles,
law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants wherever
reasonably practicable."' 1
The rule of practicability "rests upon the desirability of having magis-
trates rather than police officers determine when searches and seizures
are permissible and what limitations should be placed upon such ac-
tivities."'1 2  The mere fact that an arrest was made on the premises
searched did not warrant the search. "The test is the apparent need
for summary seizure . ... 103 (emphasis added.) Thus, according to
Trupiano, the incidental search is justified not because officers are able
to make an arrest nearby, but by specific facts giving rise to an immediate
need to search.
A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful
arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It
grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the
arrest. But there must be something more in the way of necessity than
merely a lawful arrest. The mere fact that there is a valid arrest does
not ipso facto legalize a search or seizure without a warrant. [Citing
Carroll v. United States]. Otherwise the exception swallows the general
principle, making a search warrant completely unnecessary wherever
there is a lawful arrest.104  (emphasis added.)
The Trupiano principle, however, was soon overruled. Two years
later the Court in United States v. Rabinowitz'0 5 upheld, as inci-
dent to an arrest made with a valid arrest warrant, a search of the one
room office where defendant was arrested. The search was thorough
and produced forged stamps found in defendant's desk, safe and filing
cabinets. The Court approved the search on the authority of Harris,
but in doing so it eradicated Trupiano. Assuming that the officers
had time to procure a search warrant, the Court held that the officers
101 Id. at 705.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 708.
104 Id.
105 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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were not bound to do so "because the search was otherwise reason-
able. . . ."-106 For the test of practicability, the Court substituted an
amorphous formulation of reasonableness under all the circumstances
of each case. The Court replaced a test with a conclusion. The ulti-
mate inquiry to be made under the Fourth Amendment is whether the
search is reasonable. But what are the standards by which reasonable-
ness is determined? Trupiano said the search is unreasonable if the of-
ficers have time to obtain a warrant and reasonable if the necessities of
the moment render impracticable the procuring of a warrant. The rea-
soning of Rabinowitz is circular: The search is reasonable if it is rea-
sonable.
To the extent that Trupiano v. United States, . requires a search
warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather
than on the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest, that case
is overruled. The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure
a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That cri-
terion in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances-the total at-
mosphere of the case.""
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented in Rabino-
witz:
The old saw that hard cases make bad law has its basis in experience.
But petty cases are even more calculated to make bad law. The impact
of a sordid little case is apt to obscure the implications of the generaliza-
tion to which the case gives rise. Only thus can I account for a disre-
gard of the history embedded in the Fourth Amendment and the great
place which belongs to that Amendment in the body of our liberties as
recognized and applied by unanimous decisions over a long stretch of the
Court's history.
08
The evolution of the law relating to incidental search was furthered
in two cases involving the search of automobiles. The first of these,
Preston v. United States,109 discussed earlier, relates both to the Carroll
reasonable cause search and to the incidental search. Not only did
the Court hold the search unreasonable under Carroll but it also deter-
mined that the search was not justified as incident to the arrest. The
search, being remote in time and place from the arrest, was not con-
temporaneous with the arrest. The Court explained that a contem-
poraneous search may sometimes be necessary to seize weapons, pre-
serve evidence or prevent an escape. But the emergency disappears
106 Id. at 64.
107 Id. at 66.
108 Id. at 68.
109 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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when the search is not contemporaneous with the arrest.
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for ex-
ample, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be
used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to
prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime-things which might
easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person
or under his immediate control. But these justifications are absent
where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an ac-
cused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another
place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest."i0 (em-
phasis added.)
Assuming that the police had the right to search the car at the
scene of arrest, the Court noted, "this does not decide the question
of the reasonableness of a search at a later time and at another
place.""' Thus lawful custody of a car that may be searched at the
scene of arrest does not confer the right to search at a different time
and place. The right to search without a warrant disappears with the
emergency. At the impound garage "there was no danger that any of
the men arrested could have used any weapons in the car or could have
destroyed any evidence of a crime. .. .
The second auto search case, Cooper v. California,"8 dampened any
hopes raised by Preston that the Court was returning to the Trupiano
practicability test. Officers airested Cooper for selling heroin to a police
informer, impounded his car, and a week ater searched his car and
found evidence linking him to the crime. The Supreme Court held
that the search was proper because the car had been impounded not
for the convenience of the owner but because California law" 4 then
provided for the forfeiture of any vehicle used to store or transport
narcotics. On the basis of the reason for the impound the Court sought
to distinguish the case from Preston where no reason was given for im-
pounding the car. Conceding that "lawful custody of an automobile
does not of itself dispense with constitutional requirements of searches
thereafter made of it,""' 5 the Court pointed out that the search in
Preston was entirely unrelated to the vagrancy arrest. On the authority
of Rabinowitz the Court held: "It is no answer to say that the police
could have obtained a search warrant, for '[t]he relevant test is not
110 Id. at 367.
M11 Id. at 368.
112 Id.
118 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
114 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11611 (West 1964).
15 386 U.S. at 61.
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whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the
search was reasonable.' United States v. Rabinowitz. .. .
The Court's attempt to distinguish Cooper from Preston is uncon-
vincing. It is true that in Preston the search was unrelated to the charge
for which the defendants were arrested. However, the Court in Preston
reasoned that "we may assume, as the Government urges that either be-
cause the arrests were valid or because police had probable cause to
think the car stolen, the police had the right to search the car when they
first came on the scene. But this does not decide the question of the
reasonableness of a search at a later time and at another place. 117
(emphasis added.) The search in Preston was held unreasonable not
because it was unrelated to the arrest but because, being remote in
time and place, there was no emergency that would justify dispensing
with a warrant. Thus despite the argument to the contrary by Justice
Black who wrote the majority opinions in both cases, the conclusion that
Cooper impliedly overruled Preston is not without justification."1
8
The question is now of academic interest only. Chimel v. Cali-
fornia1 9 marks a return to the practicability test of Trupiano, for areas
outside of the physical reach of the arrestee, and a reinstatement of
Preston. Officers arrested Chimel in his home for burglary of a coin
shop. On the basis of the arrest, they searched his entire three bed-
room house including the attic, garage and a small workshop. A
number of coins and tokens were seized. In a six-two decision, the
Court held that the scope of the search was constitutionally unreasonable.
In doing so the Court overruled Rabinowitz and Harris and probably
made a casualty of Cooper.2 '
The test of the scope of an incidental search is now clear: Officers
may search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate
control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' 21
116 Id. at 62.
117 376 U.S. at 367-68.
118 This was the conclusion of Justice Peters in his concurring opinion in People v.
Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 128, 424 P.2d 342, 356, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902, 916 (1967), as well as
the four dissenters in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
119 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
120 Cooper relied heavily upon United States v. Rabinowitz, 386 U.S. at 62. In
addition, the Court in Chimel, noting that Rabinowitz and Harris "have been relied
upon less and less in our own decisions," 395 U.S. at 768, compared other cited cases
and then cautioned "But see Cooper v. California. . . ." Cooper may have been cited
as a now-discredited case that has enjoyed some importance.
121 395 U.S. at 763.
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Thus the "area within his immediate control" no longer includes the
suspect's entire house. It is limited to "the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items. ....,122
(emphasis added.)
The Court in Chimel specifically reaffirmed the holding of Preston
that the need to seize weapons or evidence that might be destroyed is
"absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest."1"'
And the Cooper reasoning, where the car was searched in an impound
garage a week after defendant was arrested, could not easily be used to
satisfy a rule prohibiting searches of areas into which the accused
cannot reach.124  Thus practicability is again the test, but even that
test is far more meaningful and workable than before. It is practicable
to obtain a warrant whenever a search is to be conducted for items not
within the immediate reach of the accused.
B. The incidental search in California
We begin the discussion of the California incidental search cases
with the caveat that many of the leading cases have been discredited if
not nullified by Chimel v. California25 and Preston v. United States,12
as reaffirmed by Chimel. It is appropriate, however, to test each case
not only by the incidental search rules but by the principles governing
the reasonable cause auto search under Carroll.
The cases before Chimel permitted an incidental search "in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the
means by which it was committed,' 27 as well as weapons and escape
tools. Evidence and instrumentalities of crime may still be sought but
only if within the reach of the arrestee. The incidental search may no
longer be made merely to obtain evidence against the arrestee. And
presumably, as before Chimel, there are some arrests, principally traf-
fic violations, that will not support an incidental search. 128  The search
122 Id.
123 Id. at 764.
124 See discussion note 114 supra for the only basis upon which Cooper might be
justified: the impound pursuant to a statute requiring forfeiture of the automobile.
125 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
120 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
127 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) and discussion in Section MlT.A.
supra.
128 People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956) (double parking);
People v. Gil, 248 Cal. App. 2d 189, 56 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1967) (cannot look under
floormat incident to drunk driving arrest); People v. Shapiro, 213 Cal. App. 2d 618,
28 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1963) (equipment violation); People v. Moray, 222 Cal. App. 2d
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must be related to the purpose of the arrest. But since some crimes
neither involve the use of weapons nor do they produce contraband, a
search incident to an arrest for such a crime would be unreasonable.1
29
People v. Burke' should remain after Chimel. There, officers fol-
lowed defendant and his companion who were driving slowly and looking
at buildings in an area where numerous burglaries had been committed.
The two men stopped, got out, and because of their suspicious behavior
the officers had probable cause to arrest them. After taking defendant
into custody the officers searched his car and found a pair of gloves on
the front seat. They took the suspect to the police station, impounded
the car, later searched the trunk at the impound lot and found stolen
articles. The California Supreme Court held that the search of the in-
terior of the car at the scene of the arrest was proper as incident to the
arrest, but held unreasonable, under Preston, the search at the impound
lot. The holding that the search at the scene of the arrest was proper is
questionable under Chimel since defendant could not have reached
weapons or evidence in his car when he was in custody in the police car.
The remainder of the holding, however, was a strict application of
Preston. The court said:
The right to make a contemporaneous search without a warrant
upon lawful arrest extends to things under the accused's immediate
control and, to an extent depending upon the circumstances, to the
place where he is arrested. This is justified, for example, by the need
to seize weapons which might be used to assault an officer as well
as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime.
These justifications are ordinarily absent, however, if the accused is in
custody and the search is remote in time or place from the arrest.' 3 '
People v. Webb.. 2 is now of doubtful validity. Officers approached
defendant, who was seated in his parked car, to arrest him on an out-
standing warrant. Defendant pulled violently away from the curb,
an officer shot at the car, defendant crashed into a parked car, his auto
came to rest partially blocking traffic, and defendant was arrested.
743, 35 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1963) (failure to stop at posted stop sign and illegal left
turn); People v. Garrison, 189 Cal. App. 2d 549, 11 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1961) (va-
grancy); People v. Anders, 167 Cal. App. 2d 65, 333 P.2d 854 (1959) (reckless
driving); People v. Simpson, 170 Cal. App. 2d 524, 339 P.2d 156 (1959) (vagrancy);
People v. Sanson, 156 Cal. App. 2d 250, 319 P.2d 422 (1957) (equipment viola-
tions); People v. Molarius, 146 Cal. App. 2d 129, 303 P.2d 350 (1956) (illegal
'U" turn).
129 See 1 J. VAnON, SEARcHEs, SEizuRns AND IMMuNITIS 107-08 (1961).
180 61 Cal. 2d 575, 394 P.2d 67, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1964).
181 Id. at 579-80, 394 P.2d at 69-70, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34.
132 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1967).
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While waiting for an ambulance to arrive for an injured policeman,
one of the officers removed a red balloon from the floor of defendant's
car.1 3s The threat of a crowd that had gathered, and the fact that the
defendant's car was blocking traffic, made it necessary to remove and
impound the car. The injured policeman went to the hospital, received
attention, returned to the impound lot and there searched the car. He
found several balloons and a bindle of heroin. The California Su-
preme Court upheld the search on the authority of Rabinowitz.
Webb should no longer be followed for several reasons. The first
and most obvious is that Rabinowitz is no longer the law. Next, the
court declined to follow the Preston holding that the incidental search
is justified by the need to prevent injury, escape or the destruction of
evidence, on the theory that these are only non-exclusive "examples"
13 4
of situations in which a search incident to an arrest is warranted. This
reasoning is no longer sound since Chimel made it plain that the inci-
dental search may be made only for weapons or evidence within
the reach of the accused. Finally, the search at the impound lot cannot
be justified under the Carroll exception because at the time the car
was searched it was no longer movable. Since the car was in police
custody it would have been reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant.
This leaves only the search that turned up the red balloon at the scene
of arrest. That search"3 5 alone may conceivably have been reasonable
to prevent destruction or theft of evidence by the crowd.'8
People v. Williams3 7 presents a factual situation that illustrates the
overlap of the Carroll exception and the incidental search rules. Police
officers chased a burglary suspect; the suspect lost control of his car,
abandoned it and fled on foot. Before the suspect was arrested, the
officers searched his car and found stolen suits in the trunk. Defendant
was arrested a block away, the car impounded, and the stolen suits
133 The decision is unclear as to whether this balloon contained contraband.
134 The court picked up the words "for example" in the following language from
Preston:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the
need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or
effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of
the crime-things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the
accused's person or under his immediate control. 376 U.S. at 367.
135 It is not clear that it was a search. The balloon may have been in plain sight
on the floor, but this point was not considered in the opinion.
130 Even that seems unlikely since the officers were able to remove the vehicle
along with its other contents. This reasoning does not deny the validity of the im-
pound which was probably necessary to preserve evidence and remove the car from the
traffic lanes of the highway. See CAL. VnH. CoDE § 22651 (b) (West Supp. 1970).
137 67 Cal. 2d 226, 430 P.2d 30, 60 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1967).
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were taken into custody at the impound garage. The California
Supreme Court upheld the search as properly incident to defendant's
arrest. The conclusion is probably sound but, under Chimel, for the
wrong reason. After the defendant fled on foot there was no danger
that he would immediately obtain weapons or destructible evidence in
the car that was then in police custody. The search was therefore not
reasonable as incident to the arrest. Under Carroll, however, the car
was movable because the defendant was at large when the search was
made. Since the officers had reasonable cause to believe the movable
car contained the fruits of a burglary, their search at the scene was
reasonable. Finally, the officers were not unreasonable in waiting until
after they impounded the car to seize the evidence they had already dis-
covered in a reasonable search.
Williams must, however, be distinguished from People v. Teale,11'8
where defendant was arrested in New Orleans for murder, the car
impounded, and a perfunctory search made which disclosed no evi-
dence. The car was then sent to California where a scientific exam-
ination revealed incriminating blood stains and other evidence. As
an alternative ground139 for upholding the admission of the evidence,
the court held that if the examination in California constituted a search,
it was reasonable as a "continuation of the search lawfully begun at
the time and place of the arrest.' 140  The search at the place of arrest,
however, had not turned up the evidence. The evidence was dis-
covered in California. The relevant search is therefore the California
search. Preston clearly enunciated that the right to search at the scene of
arrest does not decide the reasonableness of a search at a later time
and at another place.
The combination of Chimel and Preston has the effect of invalidating
many California auto search cases decided before one or both of those
decisions. Cases involving searches remote in time and place from the
arrest are closer to the facts of Preston than to those of Chimel, but
actually are controlled by both cases. Remoteness in time and place
is merely one way of saying that the accused could not have reached for
evidence or weapons at the time and place of the search. Thus the
cases discussed below should be viewed in light of Preston and Chimel
and without dismissing the possibility that Carroll might provide an
alternative basis for a search.
138 70 Cal. 2d -, 450 P.2d 564, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1969).
39 The principal ground was that the car itself constituted evidence of the crime
and the scientific examination of an item of evidence was therefore not a search.
140 70 Cal. 2d at -, 450 P.2d at 573, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
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In People v. Baker,141 officers stopped defendant's car, arrested de-
fendant for drunk driving, impounded the car, booked defendant at
the station, then returned to the car, searched it and found a revolver.
The court treated the officers' conduct as a search, rather than an
inventory of the car's contents, and held the search reasonable. This
case would seem to be a blatant disregard of the Preston rule.' 42 People
v. Odegard'43 is another example of this disregard. Police arrested de-
fendant for possession of concealed weapons, impounded his car,
searched the car at the garage and found evidence connecting defendant
with a recent robbery. The court held the search reasonable on the
theory that "[s]ince the officers had lawful custody of the car, 4 the
articles found therein were properly in their possession and no new sei-
zure occurred.'1 45 This reasoning was discredited by Cooper where the
Supreme Court pointed out that "lawful custody of an automobile does
not of itself dispense with constitutional requirements of searches there-
after made of it.' 46 And in People v. Upton'4 7 the court said: "[N]or
do we think that the Constitution permits an. . .unreasonable search of
a car simply because the police had statutory authority to impound it un-
der Vehicle Code, Sections 22650 and 22651. ' 148 People v. Proch-
nau 49 attempted to distinguish an impound authorized by the Vehicle
Code 5" from the impound made by the officers in the Preston case who
took a car into custody because they did not want to have it on the
street." " As seen in Cooper, however, lawful custody of a car does not
obviate the application of the Fourth Amendment.
In People v. Robinson52 officers stopped defendant's car in front of
'41 135 Cal. App. 2d 1, 286 P.2d 510 (1955).
142 See also People v. Felli, 156 Cal. App. 2d 123, 318 P.2d 840 (1957) (hour elapsed
between arrest and search; search held reasonable).
148 203 Cal. App. 2d 427, 21 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1962).
144 Under CAL. VEH. CODE § 22651 (h) (West Supp. 1970) an officer is permitted to
impound a car when he takes its owner before a magistrate.
145 203 Cal. App. 2d at 432, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
146 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967). But see People v. Simpson, 170 Cal. App. 2d 524, 339
P.2d 156 (1959) where an obvious search at an impound garage was treated as an
inventory to avoid the constitutional problems. As a search the holding would be a
clear violation of the Preston rule.
147 257 Cal. App. 2d 677, 65 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1968).
148 Id. at 682, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 107. Inspection upheld as a proper investigation
to determine ownership of a suspected stolen car.
149 251 Cal. App. 2d 22, 59 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1967).
150 CAL. VEH. CODE § 22651 (h) (West Supp. 1970). See note 144 supra.
151 Another ground for upholding the seizure in Prochnau was that it occurred
in the course of an inventory of the contents of the car rather than pursuant to a
search.
252 62 Cal. 2d 889, 402 P.2d 834, 44 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1965).
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the police station, arrested defendant for drunkenness, booked him in-
side the station, then searched the car and discovered evidence of for-
gery. The California Supreme Court upheld as incident to the arrest
a search made "for the purpose of discovering evidence of the crime."'' 58
This holding is no longer controlling. Under Chimel the search to
discover evidence that the defendant cannot immediately destroy is
no longer permissible. Many other California cases involving auto
searches made after the suspect has been ordered outside the car,1
5 4
conducted in an impound garage,1 55 or made at another place some dis-
tance away from the place of arrest' 56 are now probably invalid.
IV. AUTO INSPECTIONS UNDER THE VEHICLE CODE
Incriminating evidence is often discovered in the course of auto in-
spections authorized by the Vehicle Code. If the inspection is lawful,
not only under the Vehicle Code but also under the Fourth Amend-
ment, evidence discovered may be seized. The California Ve-
hicle Code empowers police officers'57 to inspect automobiles in a
wide variety of situations. 58 Since evidence revealed in an authorized
158 Id. at 894, 402 P.2d at 837, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
154 People v. Wigginton, 254 Cal. App. 2d 321, 62 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967) (de-
fendants ordered out and frisked before car searched); People v. Sanders, 250 Cal.
App. 2d 123, 58 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1967) (after arrest police loosened bolts of pan
fastened to car and found marijuana); People v. Jackson, 241 Cal. App. 2d 189, 50
Cal. Rptr. 437 (1966) (search of trunk after defendant arrested); People v. Witt, 159
Cal. App. 2d 492, 324 P.2d 79 (1958) (defendants ordered out before car searched);
People v. Borbon, 146 Cal. App. 2d 315, 303 P.2d 560 (1956) (occupants frisked out-
side car before car searched).
155 People v. Cooper, 256 Cal. App. 2d 500, 64 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1967).
156 People v. Tambini, 275 Cal. App. 2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1969) (car
searched two blocks from place of arrest); People v. Loomis, 231 Cal. App. 2d 594,
42 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965) (car searched down street from place of arrest).
157 Some sections distinguish California Highway Patrolmen from other officers in
granting powers. E.g. CAL. VER. CODE 99 1650 (West Supp. 1970), 2409 (West 1960).
158 An officer may stop and inspect the safety of a vehicle load, H9 2802, 2803; or
a car being operated unsafely, § 2804. He may require the driver of an apparently
unsafe car to submit the car to appropriate tests, § 2806, inspect to determine
whether the driver is in legal possession of the load, § 2810, check size, weight,
equipment, and make tests, § 2813, or check mechanical equipment, § 2814.
A car owner must keep a registration card with the car (not necessary to keep in
plain sight), § 4454, must present it on demand of an officer, § 4462, and the officer
may inspect it to determine the registered owner and whether the car has been stolen,
§ 2805.
For violation of parking laws §§ 22500, 22504, 22652, an officer may remove a car
from the highway or impound it if not practicable to move it and park it, § 22654.
He may remove a car from a railroad track, § 22656, a stolen car from private prop-
erty, § 22653, an abandoned car, § 22702, a car involved in a hit-and-run, § 22655, and
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auto inspection is admissible against the accused, the motives of the
officers conducting the inspection should not escape scrutiny. The
courts should vigorously guard against the possibility that a Vehicle
Code inspection will be used as a subterfuge to search for evidence of
crime. We do not lack examples of police attempts at evasion of
Fourth Amendment principles. In People v. Molarius,159 officers
followed defendants' car on a bare suspicion that they had been in-
volved in a series of recent burglaries. The officers stopped defend-
ants when they made an illegal "U" turn. The officers claimed that
they had also stopped them for possession of burglary tools. The de-
fendants, however, were not charged with that crime. A search re-
vealing codeine was held unlawful. The court declared:
It is clear that the charge of vagrancy and the holding of appellants
under the traffic violation charge without releasing them on citation
and agreement to appear, were subterfuges to detain them in jail while
the automobile was searched.
160
In Wirin v. Horrall,161 the court condemned the action of the Los
Angeles Police Department in establishing roadblocks for the purpose
of conducting indiscriminate searches of persons and automobiles with-
out probable cause to believe any violation of law had occurred. The
court quoted from a speech made by Judge Irving Lehman of the New
York Court of Appeals in a 1930 address before the New York Bar
Association:
They [the police] regard themselves in a sense as soldiers engaged
in a warfare against crime, and in that warfare they sometimes apply
the maxim of 'inter arma, silent leges.' In the din of war the voice
of law is drowned. We have complacently accepted that maxim in
warfare against external and avowed enemies. I fear that many com-
placently accept it as a necessary incident of what we choose to call the
warfare of the State against crime . . . [S]uggestions that the court
should not hamper public officers by restricting them to the use of
lawful methods seem to many of our citizens in accord with practical
common sense. Our boasted guarantees of liberty, it would seem, are so
precious they must be kept for special occasions and not subjected to
may remove a car under all the circumstances set forth in § 22651, most importantly
when he arrests a person in control of the car and takes the person before a magistrate,
§ 22651 (h). Private persons employed in traffic work when authorized by the Sheriff
or Chief of Police may remove cars interfering with traffic, driveways, and otherwise
causing traffic obstructions, § 22657, and a property owner may remove a car to the
nearest public garage, § 22658. An officer or employee who removes a car must im-
pound and store it unless otherwise provided by law, § 22850.
159 146 Cal. App. 2d 129, 303 P.2d 350 (1956).
160 Id. at 132, 303 P.2d at 352.
161 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948).
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the wear and tear of daily use. Not so may the courts treat these
guarantees. In a court of law no argument based on expediency can
ever justify a lawless invasion of a legal right.
1 2
The three most important and frequently encountered auto inspec-
tions are: 1) The inspection to determine ownership or whether the
car has been stolen, 2) the inventory of the contents of the automo-
bile after or in preparation for an impound, and 3) the roadblock
inspection.
A. Inspection to determine ownership
The Vehicle Code requires owners of cars to maintain a registration
card with the car'63 and drivers to present evidence of registration upon
demand of a police officer.'0 4 A police officer has the right to inspect a
car for the purpose of determining whether a vehicle is stolen and to in-
vestigate title and registration.1 5 Thus when an officer reasonably be-
lieves a car might be stolen he may investigate to determine ownership""
and may impound the car if the circumstances strongly indicate that the
car is stolen.' 1 7 The investigation properly may include demanding
evidence of registration from the car occupant, 68 shining a flashlight
into the car to locate the registration, 6 9 inspecting the inside of the
162 Id. at 505-06, 193 P.2d at 474-75. See also People v. Dickerson, 273 Cal. App.
2d -, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 400, 403 n.4 (1969) where Justice Kaus observed:
The court appears to have ignored: 1. that the natural desire of a police officer
to see a criminal brought to justice may cause him to be less than candid in con-
nection with a collateral inquiry which does not go to what appears to him to be
the only relevant question: was the defendant a thief? 2. That law enforcement
is often a "competitive enterprise" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 [ 20 L.Ed. 2d 889,
900, 88 S.Ct. 1868]; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 [92 L.Ed. 436, 440,
68 S.Ct. 367]; and 3. that a police officer who has conducted an illegal search and
seizure may be subject to criminal, civil and disciplinary sanctions.
163 CAL. VEH. CODE § 4454 (West Supp. 1970).
104 CAL. Van. CODE § 4462 (West Supp. 1970).
165 CAL. VE. CODE § 2805 (West 1960). This section refers only to California
Highway Patrol officers, but it has been held that other officers also have the right to
conduct such investigations. See People v. Grubb, 63 Cal. 2d 614, 408 P.2d 100, 47
Cal. Rptr. 772 (1965).
166 People v. Grubb, 63 Cal. 2d 614, 408 P.2d 100, 47 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1965).
167 People v. Myles, 189 Cal. App. 2d 42, 10 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1961); People v.
Nebbitt, 183 Cal. App. 2d 452, 7 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1960).
168 CAL. VEH. CODE § 4462 (West Supp. 1970).
169 People v. Cacioppo, 264 Cal. App. 2d 392, 70 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968) (flashlight
beam revealed narcotic pills on floor and further examination disclosed marijuana).
The point was made in a rhapsodical exchange between counsel and the court:
Defendant contends that darkness creates its own legal sanctuary and tells us
'Now black and deep the night begins to fall
A shade immense! Sunk in the quenching gloom,
Magnificent and vast, are heaven and earth.
Order confounded lies; all beauty void,
Distinction lost, and gay variety
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car,170 and even inspecting the trunk' 71 if the initial investigation gives
further cause for suspicion. Evidence found in a reasonable inspection
to determine ownership may be seized.
7
1
It is said that an inspection to determine ownership under the Ve-
hicle Code, if based upon reasonable grounds to believe a car may be
stolen, involves "no unreasonable search in the constitutional sense."'
173
However, the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches is not
overcome merely by pointing to a Vehicle Code section authorizing the
inspection. "ITihe question . . . is not whether the search was autho-
orized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment."'1 74
The investigating officer must base his inspection on reasonable
grounds to suspect that the car may have been stolen. California Ve-
One universal blot!' (Thompson, The Seasons, Autumn, L.113)
And more acceptably
'Tender is the Night....
I cannot see what flowers are at thy feet,
Nor what soft incense hangs upon
The boughs,
But, in embalmed darkness, guess each Sweet.' (Keats, Ode to a Nightingale)
In the harsh light of reality we respond:
'Oh, treacherous night! thou lendest thy ready
veil to every treason, and teeming mischiefs thrive
beneath thy shade.' (A. Hill)
and
'Under thy mantle black, there hidden lie,
light shunning theft, and traitorous intent, abhorred
bloodshed, and the felony, shameful deceit, and
danger imminent, foul, horror, and eke hellish detriment.'-Spenser
Perforce 'Et]his night methinks is but the daylight sick.'
(The Merchant of Venice, VC. 1597)
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Id. at 397-98, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60.
170 People v. Grubb, 63 Cal. 2d 614, 408 P.2d 100, 47 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1965)
(officers entered car to find registration slip and found "billy"); People v. Evans, 240
Cal. App. 2d 291, 49 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1966) (officers stopped car with different front
and rear license plates and saw suspicious articles in plain sight inside; further search
thereby justified as a search incidental to an arrest).
171 People v. Evans, 240 Cal. App. 2d 291, 49 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1966).
172 People v. Grubb, 63 Cal. 2d 614, 408 P.2d 100, 47 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1965)
(illegal "billy"); People v. Drake, 243 Cal. App. 2d 560, 52 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1966)
(marijuana); People v. Galceran, 178 Cal. App. 2d 312, 2 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1960)
(marijuana).
173 People v. Prochnau, 251 Cal. App. 2d 22, 29, 59 Cal. Rptr. 265, 270-71 (1967)
(narcotics found in registration inspection; further search revealed sawed off shot-
gun); People v. Drake, 243 Cal. App. 2d 560, 52 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1966) (marijuana
found in inspection to determine ownership). These cases suggest, but do not clearly
state, that an inspection to determine ownership does not constitute a search at all.
It seems clear that prying into closed areas constitutes a search and that the inspection
must meet Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 61 (1967).
174 Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967).
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hicle Code Section 4454, which now provides that the registration card
must be maintained with the car, formerly required that the card be
visible from outside the car. Before the amendment, inspections were
frequently justified by the officer's inability to see the registration card
in plain sight. 175 This ground no longer being available, the inspection
must now be justified by other facts that afford a reasonable basis for
suspicion of auto theft. Such facts include missing license plates," '
barely legible plates, 177 different plates on the front and rear of the
car,178 suspicious conduct of car occupants, 17 and evasive and untrue
answers to proper police questions. s0 Each step of the investigation
must be reasonable. Officers must have a reasonable basis for stopping
a car '8 and for proceeding with a further investigation of the car's
interior.
182
Several California cases have relaxed the requirement that an in-
spection for ownership be based on reasonable cause to believe the car
may be stolen. A regrettable example is People v. Simons,18 8 discussed
earlier. The court upheld the search as a proper inspection to deter-
mine ownership and added that because the service station proprietor had
suggested that the car owner "acted odd", the search was further justified
to see if there were stolen articles or contraband. Judicial common sense
is sadly lacking in this decision. Initially the officer had no legitimate
175 People v. Prochnau, 251 Cal. App. 2d 22, 59 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1967) (narcotics
and sawed off shotgun found); People v. Lozano, 250 Cal. App. 2d 58, 58 Cal. Rptr.
102 (1967) (stolen coins found in search for registration slip); People v. Guerrero, 247
Cal. App. 2d 687, 56 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1967) (stolen purses under floor mat).
176 People v. Galceran, 178 Cal. App. 2d 312, 2 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1960).
177 People v. Cacioppo, 264 Cal. App. 2d 392, 70 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968).
178 People v. Evans, 240 Cal. App. 2d 291, 49 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1966).
179 People v. Airheart, 262 Cal. App. 2d 673, 68 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1968).
180 People v. Nebbitt, 183 Cal. App. 2d 452, 7 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1960).
181 People v. Cacioppo, 264 Cal. App. 2d 392, 70 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968) (icense
plate barely legible); People v. Procbnau, 251 Cal. App. 2d 22, 59 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1967)
(parole violation); People v. Myles, 189 Cal. App. 2d 42, 10 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1961)
(traffic violation); People v. Nebbitt, 183 Cal. App. 2d 452, 7 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1960)
(equipment violations); People v. Dore, 146 Cal. App. 2d 541, 304 P.2d 103 (1956)
(defendant tried to run down officers).
182 People v. Airheart, 262 Cal. App. 2d 673, 68 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1968) (investi-
gation raised suspicion that the car was stolen); People v. Evans, 240 Cal. App. 2d 291,
49 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1966) (defendant's suspicious statements justified further investiga-
tion); People v. Grubb, 63 Cal. 2d 614, 408 P.2d 100, 47 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1965) (possibly
abandoned car); People v. Moulton, 210 Cal. App. 2d 673, 27 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1962) (car
with warm motor near scene of burglary justified suspicion car was stolen or was getaway
car); People v. Nebbitt, 183 Cal. App. 2d 452, 7 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1960) (driver's sus-
picious statements); People v. Galceran, 178 Cal. App. 2d 312, 2 Cal. Rptr. 901
(1960) (auto registered in irregular manner in name of person not present and driver
not licensed which raised suspicion that car was stolen).
183 208 Cal. App. 2d 83, 25 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1962).
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reason to inspect for ownership. His testimony that he did not see the
registration slip on top of the dashboard approaches the inherently im-
probable. His search of the shaving case for registration was certainly
unwarranted. And the report that the car owner "acted odd" was an
insufficient basis for the belief that the car contained stolen articles or
contraband.
In People v. Drake,"' officers investigated a car parked three or
four feet from a curb.' The left door was open about an inch and
a half, and the registration indicated that the car was owned by a person
who lived two miles away. Even though the "hot-sheet" did not indicate
that the car was stolen, the officer proceeded to check the ignition to
see if it was "hot-wired" but found a bag of marijuana before he "got
that far." The car owner was found asleep in a house across the
street. The court held that the officers' actions were a proper response
to a reasonable belief that the car was stolen and hurriedly abandoned.
It is difficult to understand the manner in which a slightly opened door
of a car parked three to four feet from the curb, registered to a per-
son who lives two miles away, affords a reasonable basis for a belief
that the car is stolen. There is no indication in the decision that the
car was in fact "hot-wired", stolen or abandoned.
B. Impound and inventory
The Vehicle Code gives a police officer the right to remove an auto
from the highway 86 or from private property 87 under certain specific-
ally enumerated circumstances. 8 An officer has no authority to re-
move from the highway an unattended vehicle8 9 or the vehicle of an
arrested person' 90 except as provided by the Vehicle Code. Most fre-
quently invoked is the provision which authorizes a police officer to re-
move from the highway the auto of an arrested person whom the officer
is by law required or permitted to, and does take, before a magistrate
without unnecessary delay. 191 The vehicle must be taken to the near-
184 243 Cal. App. 2d 560, 52 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1966).
181 In violation of CAL. VEH. CODE § 22502 (West Supp. 1970).
186 CAL. VE. CODE §§ 22651, 22652, 22654 (West Supp. 1970).
187 CAL. Van. CODE § 22653 (West 1960).
188 These include an officer's right to remove an auto obstructing traffic, CAL. VEH.
CODE § 22651 (a) & (b), a stolen auto, § 22651 (c), a driveway, § 22651 (d), or access
to a fire hydrant, § 22651 (e), etc. (West Supp. 1970). See also §§ 22651, 22652, 22653
and 22654.
180 CAL. VEH. CODE § 22650 (West 1960); People v. Fritz, 253 Cal. App. 2d 7, 16,
61 Cal. Rptr. 247, 253 (1967).
10 28 Op. Ar'Y GEN. 185 (1956).
191 CAL. VEH. CODE § 22651 (h) (West Supp. 1970). See People v. Marchese, 275
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est garage or other place of safety.192  The police officer has actually
been considered an involuntary bailee of the car he impounds.9 8
Police agencies often contract with private garage owners for the stor-
age of impounded autos. To protect the car owner, the garage operator
and the police officers from false theft claims, standard practice often
requires an officer to inventory the contents of the impounded car.' 94
Although recognized by California courts, the right to inventory is not
authorized by statute. The inventory may be made either before' 95 or
after "'96 the car is taken to a garage or other place of safety.
If it is not abused, the right to inventory the contents of an impounded
car is a reasonable precaution against theft claims. The problem
arises when the inventory is used as a pretext for a search for incrimin-
ating evidence. The problem is critical because California courts do not
view an inventory as a search.'17  The cases should be decided on the
basis of the motivation which actuated the officer, not by what he had a
right to do. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
is to deter lawless police invasions of privacy."" An unreasonable
search for evidence should not be excused because an officer may have
had the right, which he did not exercise, to make an inventory. If he
actually made an inventory the question is whether he had a right to do
so, and whether he properly exercised that right. But if the facts
show that he conducted a search, the admissibility of evidence should
be judged by the constitutional standards governing searches, not by
Cal. App. 2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1969); People v. Roth, 261 Cal. App. 2d 430, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 49 (1968).
192 CAL. VEH. CODE § 22850 (West Supp. 1970).
193 People v. Roth, 261 Cal. App. 2d 430, 436, 68 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53 (1968), under
CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1813, 1815, 1816 and 1817 (West 1954).
194 The Highway Patrol has a standard inventory checklist. See People v. Roth,
261 Cal. App. 2d 430, 68 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1968). People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal. App. 2d 248,
250, 305 P.2d 145, 147 (1956) may be the first case to speak of the inventory as a
protection to the owner, bailee, or officer.
195 People v. Marchese, 275 Cal. App. 2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1969); People v.
Norris, 262 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 897, 68 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1968), and People v. Ortiz,
147 Cal. App. 2d 248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956) (inventory made while car on street prior
to impounding).
196 People v. Cook, 275 Cal. App. 2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1969) ("quick check"
at scene, full inventory at garage); People v. Roth, 261 Cal. App. 2d 430, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 49 (1968) (inventory at garage).
197 People v. Marchese, 275 Cal. App. 2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1969); People v.
Norris, 262 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 897, 68 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1968); People v. Roth, 261 Cal.
App. 2d 430, 68 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1968); People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal. App. 2d 248, 305 P.2d
145 (1956). Apparently the Supreme Court of the United States takes the same view.
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
198 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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inventory rules.
In Preston, officers searched a car at an impound garage. Since
there was no evidence that thi'inspection was intended as an inventory, it [
was treated as a search and its validity was tested by constitutional search
principles. The California Supreme Court followed Preston in People
v. Burke,199 where an auto inspection at an impound lot was viewed as
an unreasonable search. The court could have overlooked the unlawful
search on the basis of an unexercised right to inventory but it properly
refused to do so. 200  Conceding the propriety of the impound under
the Vehicle Code,20 1 the court pointed out: "The officers were author-
ized by these [Vehicle Code] sections to remove defendant's car from
the highway and impound it but the sections do not purport to authorize
the making of a search.
'202
While some cases have involved legitimate inventories which revealed
incrimating evidence, 203 others have excused obvious searches by
calling them inventories. In People v. Simpson,2°4 officers arrested
the defendant, and three others who were asleep in a parked car, for
vagrancy. The suspects were taken to the police station and the car was
left on the street. At the station, an officer recognized defendant and,
with no basis for the question, asked defendant if he had been implicated
in a burglary and possession of marijuana on a prior occasion. Only
after this question was asked did another officer suddenly decide that he
suspected the four of transporting marijuana. Thereupon two officers
left the station, the first intending to search the car, the second intend-
ing to impound it. The second officer testified at the preliminary
hearing that he had intended to search the car but at the trial he said
his intention was to impound it. Marijuana was found in the car. The
court treated as an inventory pursuant to an impound what appeared
to be an unreasonable search. There was no thought of impounding
199 61 Cal. 2d 575, 394 P.2d 67, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1964).
200 That the court considered and rejected the right to inventory is shown by
Justice Schauer's dissent approving the inspection as an inventory.
201 CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 22651 (h) and 22850 (West Supp. 1970).
202 People v. Burke, 61 Cal. 2d at 580, 394 P.2d at 70, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
203 People v. Marchese, 275 Cal. App. 2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1969) (California
Highway Patrol form used to inventory wrecked car); People v. Norris, 262 Cal. App.
2d Supp. 897, 68 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1968) (inventory of wrecked car on street after
owner taken to hospital); People v. Roth, 261 Cal. App. 2d 430, 68 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1968)
(California Highway Patrol Form 180 used to inventory contents of wrecked car found
to contain marijuana in tobacco pouch; somewhat questionable was the asserted need
to open the pouch in the course of the inventory); People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal. App. 2d
248, 305 P.2d 145 (1956) (inventory on street before impound after "drunk auto"
arrest).
204 170 Cal. App. 2d 524, 339 P.2d 156 (1959).
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the car until one officer had the groundless suspicion that it might con-
tain incriminating evidence.
In People v. Garcia,0 5 officers stopped defendant, arrested him
on outstanding traffic warrants, searched his car, and found four cases
of stolen whiskey. The court treated the search as an inventory and
upheld the seizure. Citing the Vehicle Code section200 which authorizes
an officer to impound the car of an arrestee whom he takes before a
magistrate, the court noted that an inventory may be made pursuant
to an impound. The problem with that reasoning is that there is no
indication the officers impounded the car and no evidence that an in-
ventory was made. The evidence was found in an apparently unreason-
able search that was neither incident to the arrest nor based on rea-
sonable cause to believe the car contained items subject to seizure.20 7
-People v. Garrison,2 °s on the other hand, conforms to the intention
of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant and his companion were arrested
as they entered defendant's car. Officers impounded the car, searched
it four days later, and found evidence of forgery. The court held the
search unlawful. The search was neither incidental to the arrest four
days earlier nor, since the car had been impounded, was it subject to
search as a movable vehicle under Carroll. The court viewed the
officers' conduct as a search for evidence of forgery and refused to
treat it as an inventory for the purpose of avoiding the Fourth Amend-
ment.
Several California cases have not found it necessary to implement
the inventory rule to excuse an otherwise unreasonable search. These
cases hold that "[S]ince the officers had lawful custody of the car [by
impounding it], the articles found therein were properly in their posses-
sion and no new seizure occurred. ' 20 9  This rationale ignores the
principal that "lawful custody of an automobile does not of itself dis-
pense with Constitutional requirements of searches thereafter made of
205 214 Cal. App. 2d 681, 29 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1963).
206 CAL. VEH. CODE § 22651 (h) (West Supp. 1970).
207 See also People v. Cook, 275 Cal. App. 2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1969)
("real quick checek" of car before taking owner to hospital should not have qualified as
inventory since no inventory made until the next day); People v. Myles, 189 Cal. App.
2d 42, 10 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1961) (inventory used as alternative basis for upholding
seizure where there was no evidence that an inventory was actually made).
208 189 Cal. App. 2d 549, 11 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1961).
209 People v. Odegard, 203 Cal. App. 2d 427, 432, 21 Cal. Rptr. 515, 518 (1962); see
also People v. Garcia, 214 Cal. App. 2d 681, 684-5, 29 Cal. Rptr. 609, 611 (1963);
People v. Myles, 189 Cal. App. 2d 42, 48, 10 Cal. Rptr. 733, 736 (1961) (alternate
ground of decision).
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it.' '2 10 And in People v. Upton,211 the court stated: "[N]or do we think
that the Constitution permits an otherwise unreasonable search of a car
simply because the police have statutory authority to impound it under
Vehicle Code Sections 22650 and 22651. " 212
The constitutionality of California Vehicle Code Sections 22651(h)
and 22850, which authorize an officer to impound the car of an arrestee
whom he takes before a magistrate, has not been challenged in Califor-
nia appellate courts. Some cases, however, may involve situations af-
fording no rational basis for an impound. For example, if a man is
arrested in his car which is properly parked in his driveway or on the
street, the mere fact that the officer takes the arrestee before a magis-
trate provides no rational basis for impounding the car. Distinguishing
Preston, the Supreme Court in Cooper v. California21 3 recognized that
there are circumstances of arrest that do not warrant an impound. The
Cooper Court reasoned that Preston did not suggest that the inventory
was, "[D]one other than for Preston's convenience or that the police
had any right to impound the car and keep it from Preston or whom-
ever he might send for it."'2 14 In the absence of a reasonable basis for
the application of Sections 22651 (h) and 22850 in particular cases, the
provisions might well be of doubtful constitutionality.
Another danger to which the courts should be alert is the use of the
right to impound as a subterfuge for a search. We have seen cases in
which a purported inventory pursuant to an impound was or should
have been treated as a search. In other cases, the propriety of the im-
pound itself may be subject to attack. People v. Molarius21 5 is an ex-
ample. Officers arrested defendants for making an illegal "U" turn and
for vagrancy, took the defendants to jail, and then searched their car.
Holding the search unreasonable, the court said: "It is clear that the
charge of vagrancy and the holding of appellants under the traffic vio-
lation charge without releasing them on citation and agreement to appear
were subterfuges to detain them in jail while the automobile was
searched.121 6  (emphasis added.) The failure to release on citation
should now more frequently be considered evidence of bad faith by an
officer in light of the 1967 enactment of California Penal Code Section
210 Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967).
211 257 Cal. App. 2d 677, 65 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1968).
212 Id. at 682, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
213 Cooper v. California, 368 U.S. at 61.
214 Id. Cf. People v. De La Torre, 257 Cal. App. 2d 162, 64 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1967)
(state has legitimate interest in conducting safety check roadblocks).
215 146 Cal. App. 2d 129, 303 P.2d 350 (1956).
216 Id. at 132, 303 P.2d at 352.
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853.6. That Section permits an arresting officer to immediately release
on citation and promise to appear, any person arrested for a misde-
meanor who does not demand to be taken before a magistrate. A
1969 amendment adds Subdivision (i) which requires that if an arrestee
is not released on citation before being booked, the police must, at
the time of booking, make an immediate investigation of the arrestee's
background to determine whether he should be released on citation.
Penal Code Section 853.6 should diminish the effectiveness of the im-
pound under Vehicle Code Sections 22651 (h) and 22850.
C. The roadblock inspection
There are few California cases dealing with roadblock inspections
that reveal incriminating evidence. California Vehicle Code Section
2814 authorizes the establishment of random auto safety and equip-
ment inspections. People v. De La Torre217 held Section 2814 constitu-
tional as authorizing a roadblock established to conduct safety checks 218
rather than to search for evidence.
The constitutional "right to free movement"2 19 may not be unrea-
sonably restricted. In particular, the roadblock may not be used as a
device to conduct unreasonable searches for evidence. The leading case
is Wirin v. Horral1220 where the court held that a cause of action was
stated by a complaint seeking an injunction restraining the Los Angeles
Police Department from the indiscriminate stopping and searching of
autos and persons without cause to believe that any law had been vio-
lated. The court said:
Persons lawfully within the United States of America are entitled to
use the public highways and have a right to free passage thereon with-
out interruption or search, unless a public officer authorized to search
knows of probable cause for believing that the vehicle is carrying
contraband or that the occupants thereof have violated some law.221
217 257 Cal. App. 2d 162, 64 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1967).
218 See City of Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1959) (roadblock for
purpose of checking drivers' licenses held not an unreasonable search).
219 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867); Comment, Interference with the
Right to Free Movement: Stopping and Search of Vehicles, 51 CALip. L. Rav. 907
(1963); Note, Use of Police Roadblock to Inspect Drivers' Licenses, 6 WAYNa L. Rv.
417, 418-19 (1960); Note, 22 S. CAL. L. REv. 181 (1949).
220 85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948).
221 Id. at 501, 193 P.2d at 472. See also People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294
P.2d 13 (1956) (Court held unreasonable stopping of car leaving California for Mexico
without cause to believe that the driver had committed any violation of law).
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CONCLUSION
Although the automobile search presents problems unique in the
general law of search and seizure, fundamental Fourth Amendment
principles are the same. If evidence is seized in the course of a search
made without a warrant the search is unreasonable unless it falls within
an established exception to the requirement that a warrant be obtained.
These exceptions apply only when it is not practicable to obtain a war-
rant. There are two principal exceptions that apply to the automobile
search.
First, under Carroll v. United States, a "movable" automobile may be
searched when officers have reasonable cause to believe that the car
contains items subject to seizure. An automobile is movable only when
the officer reasonably believes that it may be moved. It is not con-
sidered movable when it is in police custody in an impound garage.
Second, subject to narrow limitations, an automobile may be searched
without a warrant if incident to a valid arrest or pursuant to a
valid arrest warrant. The scope of the incidental search, under Chimel,
cannot exceed those areas within the arrestee's physical reach. The
search at an impound garage or at other places after the defendant has
been arrested and removed is not incident to the arrest.
Although the reasonable automobile search and the search incident
to a valid arrest are two distinct principles, they are both governed by
a test of practicability. Thus under Preston and Chimel, reasonable
searches will become invalid if a search warrant is not obtained when
it is practicable to do so.
The threat of subterfuges to Fourth Amendment guarantees still lies
in the area of automobile inspections and inventories. The fruits of
what would otherwise constitute an unreasonable search may not be lost
if the police can show that they were accidentally discovered, not in a
search for evidence, but in the course of a legitimate vehicle inspection
or inventory. The continuing problem is that such inspections and
inventories can be and often are used to disguise unreasonable searches.
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